The latest development in the Russia-Georgia saga has seen the USA pledge $1 billion in aid to Georgia after the damage to its infrastructure caused by the Russian incursion in August. Simultaneously, the American Vice-President, Dick Cheney, is touring countries in the former Soviet bloc, assuring its people that America has a continued interest in their wellbeing. Tomorrow, he visits Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, which has already been paid a visit by our own David Miliband and which many have identified as a potential flashpoint in the beginning of a new Cold War.
Russia has already said it is not afraid of another Cold War. This is not surprising for, in terms of European energy supplies, Russia would have a significant advantage in any such 'struggle'.
Is this crisis indicative of a new cold war, or a cold snap? Russia's reaction to the initial Georgian incursion into South Ossetia was out of proportion. To invade parts of Georgia was a unilateral decision unbecoming of a large world power. It has drawn historical comparisons to Hitler's invasion of the Sudetenland in 1938, where the German leader appointed himself the advocate for ethnic Germans living in that region. Medvedev's Russia had similar motivations when it leapt to South Ossetia's defence. The fear now is that something similar will occur with the Russians living in the Ukraine.
There is a consensus among EU and NATO member countries, that the newly aggressive Russian foreign policy is intolerable and that sanctions and isolation will greet a country that continues to try and forcefully impose its will on countries within its immediate sphere of influence. Furthermore, there is an argument that says the conflict has marked the end of what many see as the new world order that arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
Such an argument is valid when one considers how Russia has chosen to return to the world stage as a major player. Yet, to blithely speak of a new cold war, a return to the Russia of old, is a fallacy that some Western governments have already been guilty of.
The nationalist concerns of Russia, Georgia and South Ossetia have been there since the end of the Cold War. In fact, the demand on the part of the former Soviet republics for individual national identity (including Russia) were driving forces behind the collapse of the USSR, arguably taking the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev further than he initially intended. As far as Georgia and South Ossetia are concerned, the situation has flared up before and in the past, Russia has mediated, albeit more peacefully. Russia's own attempts at playing peacekeeper in the area have been undermined by factors such as their involvement in the Chechyan war and accusations of their own self-interest in South Ossetia, principally from Georgia.
Ultimately, the current crisis has been another example of national interest being bound up in foreign policy and vice-versa. This is not only the case with Russia, but with the US, EU and NATO. Dick Cheney's tour of the area in the last few days has reminded the Ukraine and Georgia that the US has a vested interest in the region too. While this has been portrayed under the guise of humanitarian aid, these two countries are key to ensuring a smooth supply of energy to the rest of Europe, should Russia's isolation from the international community grow more marked. Gordon Brown has tied this into the need for alternative energy supplies and he is right to do so.
In the case of Georgia and the Ukraine, the drive for national and international recognition has led them to seek membership with NATO, an organisation that has found new relevance post-9/11 and yet, for Russia, could be perceived as a lingering Cold War symbol in a post-Cold War world. While NATO is seen as key to Georgian and Ukranian national security, in Russian eyes it has expanded ever eastwards. No doubt questions have been raised in Moscow as to why Georgia can join NATO, while Russia cannot. The answer is that Russia has internal problems it needs to resolve before meeting the criteria - but then so does Georgia.
Russia may revert to type, but politicians such as Bush, Cheney and McCain in US and Miliband in the UK, should refrain from identifying too quickly with Georgia. For McCain to declare 'we are all Georgians tonight' is another example of our governments quickly taking sides in conflicts which have complex ethnic and political histories.
Russia's actions in the Georgian crisis should be condemned. That said, future diplomatic relations should be mindful that Russia has returned as a world power and that. along with China, it can challenge the post-CW dominance of the West. If we want historical comparisons, it is more helpful to think of the return of the 19th century model of countries competing for spheres of influence, balance of power, although even this is not an ideal system, as WW1 eventually proved.
Russia is a potential ally in dealing with Iran, North Korea. But, the next US President and future Prime Ministers should be prepared for the fact that its need for international recognition may manifest itself differently from that of Georgia, the Ukraine or that of the West. One hundred years ago, Theodore Roosevelt told America to 'tread carefully and carry a big stick'. Russia may just be coming to the same conclusion.
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